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Abstract
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as well as the unemployment rates. We show that an increase in the supply of
high-skilled labour can explain skilled-biased technological change, a reduction
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In accordance with convincing empirical evidence, the high-skilled suffer from
shorter and fewer spells of unemployment.
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It is by now a well-documented fact that starting in the 1980s, wage differentials
between high- and low-skilled workers have risen and simultaneously there has
been a sharp decline in demand for low-skilled workers (see Katz 2000, Deard-
off, Hakura 1994 and Johnson 1997 for overviews and Fitzenberger 1999
for a detailed analysis for West Germany). Somewhat surprisingly, this rise in
relative high-skilled wages was accompanied by a large increase in the supply of
skilled labour (see OECD 1993, OECD 2000, Katz, Murphy 1992). Two possi-
ble causes for the increased wage dispersion most commonly stated are increased
trade with low-skill labour abundant countries and skilled-biased technological
change whereby new technologies and high-skilled labour are complements. Al-
though most empirical tests tend to favour the skilled-biased technological change
hypothesis and tend to dismiss the trade hypothesis (see, for example, Desjon-
queres et al. 1999 and Fitzenberger 1999 for empirical evidence), as Wood
(1998) points out, the two different explanations are not mutually exclusive. Fur-
ther, Aghion et al. (1999) show that by dropping the assumption that increased
international trade is only in final goods and instead analysing increased trade in
intermediate goods can account for a much larger share of the increase in wage
inequality than the conventional empirical tests. In addition, as shown for exam-
ple in Acemoglu (1999), Kremer, Maskin (1996) and Lindbeck, Snower
(1996), there has been a substantial amount of organisational change within firms
in recent years and that this change has increased the productivity gap (and
therefore wages) between workers with different skill levels. However, as shown in
Aghion et al. (1999), both the increased trade in intermediate goods as well as
the organisational change within firms can be attributed to skilled-biased tech-
nological change. It is for this reason that the paper focuses on skilled-biased
technological change and how it influences the unemployment rates of the high-
and low-skilled respectively.
Even most modern growth models either treat labour as homogeneous in which
case there cannot be any skill-bias, or, even if heterogeneous labour is taken into
account, assume neutral technological change (see, for example, Şener 2001,Li
2001 or Dinopoulos, Thompson 1999). Models that do explicitly incorporate
skilled-biased technological change (see, for example, Albrecht, Vroman 2001,
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Acemoglu 1999, Mortensen, Pissarides 1999, Gregg, Manning 1997,
Eicher 1996, Mincer 1995, Bound, Johnson 1995, 1992, Katz, Murphy
1992 or Juhn et al. 1993) assume that it is exogenous. Notable exceptions are
the models of Kiley (1999), who analyses an expanding variety model, and Ace-
moglu (1998) who concentrates on rising quality. However, both assume perfectly
competitive labour markets, so that they cannot analyse the effects of skilled-
biased technological change on unemployment. The aim of the present paper is
to extend Acemoglu’s quality-ladder model by allowing for matching frictions in
the labours market for both low- and high-skilled workers to not only explain the
rise in relative high-skilled wages but also in long-term unemployment, especially
amongst the low-skilled.
As in Acemoglu (1998), whether research firms develop new components to be
used by high- or low-skilled workers depends on two counteracting forces. On the
one hand, a higher supply of skilled labour implies that there are more workers
available who are able to use the high-skill complementary components. There-
fore, research firms invent new components for a larger market so that the flow
profits from these inventions increase. This is called the directed technology effect.
On the other hand, by the standard substitution effect, a higher supply of skilled
labour reduces the high-skilled wage. Thus, the high-skilled good commands a
lower price which works as a disincentive to innovate for this sector. Obviously,
an analogous argumentation holds for low-skilled workers. In a steady-state equi-
librium, profits from research targeted at high- and low-skill complementary com-
ponents must be equal. We find that an increase in the fraction of high-skilled
workers can lead both to a lower high-skilled unemployment rate as well as to a
larger wage differential between the low- and high-skilled. In addition, compared
to perfectly competitive labour markets, the directed technology effect is smaller
and innovative firms require time to fill their newly established vacancies and
start their production, so that the steady-state innovation rate is lower.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the dynamic time path of
households’ expenditures as a result of intertemporal optimisation decisions. In
Section 3 the production side of the economy is introduced. A final consumption
good is produced using two intermediates as inputs. These intermediates use a
variety of components whose qualities are upgraded by a sequence of innovations
due to intentional R&D activity carried out in a separate research sector. Section 4
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analyses the pricing behaviour of firms in the component sector. Section 5 focuses
on R&D competition. The labour markets for high- and low-skilled workers are
characterised by matching frictions outlined in Section 6. Section 7 solves the
model and identifies the determinants of both technological change as well as
unemployment. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Households’ Spending Behaviour
In the household sector, we assume that individuals share identical preferences








where C is the consumption level, ρ is the common rate of time preference, t is
the time index, and γ > 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility.1
Households which are composed of high- and low-skilled workers as well as unem-
ployed individuals, maximise the utility function subject to their dynamic budget
constraints
Ġ = rG+ Iw − C
where the price of the final consumption good is normalised to one, r is the nom-
inal (and real) interest rate, G denotes the value of household assets, and Iw the
average wage income of each household. Solving this intertemporal optimisation






(r − ρ) (2)
Because of the homothetic preferences, the growth rate (2) applies not only to
each household, but also to the whole economy when C denotes the aggregated
consumption level.





3 Input Decisions of Competitive Firms in the
High- and Low-Skilled Sectors
The production technology setup is similar to that in Acemoglu (1998, 2001a,b).
The homogeneous consumption good Y is produced using low- and high-skilled













where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution factor which measures the relative importance
of the input factors, As, s ∈ {l, h} are the technology parameters of type s labour
where the index l denotes low-skilled and h high-skilled labour. The terms Nl and
Nh denote the number of (employed) low- and high-skilled workers respectively.
They are determined by Nh = (1 − uh)ψN and Nl = (1 − ul)(1 − ψ)N where
us are the respective unemployment rates to be endogenised below and ψ is the
exogenously given fraction of the workforce which is skilled. The size of the work-
force is assumed to be exogenously given by N . The output elasticity of labour is
given by α ∈ (0, 1). The parameter σ > 0 denotes the constant elasticity of sub-
stitution between low- and high-skilled workers. With the production technology
as specified in equation (3), the two types of labour are gross substitutes if σ > 1.
Many empirical studies have estimated the value of σ (see, for example, Bound,
Johnson 1992 and Katz, Murphy 1992). Although there is a large variation
in the estimation results, most studies come to a value greater than one so it is
this case that we will concentrate on.


















for the considered case of σ > 1, skilled-biased technological change occurs due
to a relative increase in the high-skilled technology Ah which raises the relative













ensures that high-skilled marginal productivity is
higher than that of the low-skilled. The same result can also be achieved by assuming that
the high-skilled are more productive than the low-skilled when using unskilled technology Al.
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gross substitutes, an increase in the high-skilled (low-skilled) productivity and
the resulting rise (fall) in the relative wage of high- to low-skilled workers leads
to a more than proportionate increase in low-skilled (high-skilled) labour demand,
so that the relative marginal productivity of the high-skilled will be higher (lower)
than before.
In order to keep the analysis simple, we reinterpret the production function as
given by (3) and assume that the consumption good Y is produced from two
intermediates, each produced in a separate sector using only one type of labour.3











where Yl and Yh are intermediate




s , s ∈ {l, h} (5)
Denoting with ps the price of the two intermediate goods, means that their relative












As each type of labour is only employed in the production of one of these two
intermediates, s ∈ {l, h} can also be interpreted as a sector index. Within each
sector, production uses sector-specific labour and a continuum js ∈ [0, 1] of differ-
ent components. The assumption that these components are also sector-specific
is the means by which the technology differs for high- and low-skilled labour.
The highest component quality currently available is denoted by qs(j). The de-
mand for each component j used by firm i in sector s is denoted by xs(i, j) and








3 Alternatively, the original production function can be interpreted either as there being only
one good which is produced using low- and high-skilled workers as imperfect substitutes or
a combination of the above two possibilities with the economy being comprised of various
sectors each producing goods which are imperfect substitutes for another and in which all
sectors employ both types of labour.
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which means that production of Yl and Yh takes place at constant returns to scale.
Flow profits of firm i purchasing components of quality qs(j) are determined by




χs(j)xs(i, j)dj − wsns(i) (8)
where ns(i) is the amount of labour of type s employed by firm i, with total
labour demand in each sector given by
∫ īs
0
ns(i)di = Ns where īs is the number
of firms in either sector, and χs(j) is the price of a component with quality
qs(j) in the respective sector. Note, however, that due to the constant returns to
scale production technology, labour demand in each sector is independent of the
number of firms.











This concludes the description of the final and intermediate goods sectors. The
next section analyses the behaviour of firms producing the components used in
the intermediate sectors.
4 Pricing Behaviour of Incumbent Firms
In all industries in either sector, qs(j) units of the final good are needed to man-
ufacture one unit of the state-of-the-art component j. Thus, the production costs
increase with the components’ quality. An industry leader whose technology is
assumed to be perfectly protected by an infinitely lived patent, will maximise his
profit function
Πs(j) = χs(j)xs(j)− qs(j)xs(j) (10)






Each innovation carried out in the research sector improves the quality of a com-
ponent by the exogenously given factor λ > 1. The size of each quality improve-
ment is the same for all components in both sectors. Imposing λ > (1−α)−(1−α)/α,
i.e. assuming drastic innovations, ensures that firms producing the intermediate
goods Yl and Yh will prefer buying the highest quality components even if lower
quality ones are sold at marginal costs.
With the component prices as given by equation (11), each firm in either sector
buys xs(i, j) components so that Xs(j) = [(1 − α)psNαs ]
1
α and by equation (7),
equilibrium productivity in sector s is given by










qs(j)dj is the average quality of components used in sector s.
5 R&D Competition of Potential Entrants
The quality of components can be upgraded by a sequence of innovations, each
of which builds upon its predecessors. To produce a higher quality component,
a blueprint is needed, which is developed by innovative firms in a separate R&D
sector. The lure of innovation rents drives potential entrants to engage in risky
R&D projects to search for the blueprint of a higher quality component. The price
for an innovation is the profit flow (10) that will last until the next innovation
success is achieved within this industry. There is free entry into each innovation
race and the potential entrepreneur can target his research efforts at any of the
continuum of state-of-the-art components in either sector. Any research firm un-
dertaking R&D at intensity hs(j) for a time interval of length dt will succeed
in taking the next step up the quality ladder for the targeted component with
probability hs(j). This implies that the number of realised innovations in each
industry follows a Poisson process with the industry-specific arrival rate hs(j),
which is given by
hs(j) = zs(j)φ(zs(j)) (13)
where zs(j) is R&D input in terms of the final good and it is assumed that
φ′(zs(j)) < 0 and h
′
s(zs(j)) = φ(zs(j))+zs(j)φ
′(zs(j)) ≥ 0 to account for decreas-
ing returns to R&D effort. With research productivity given by 1/µ, at a flow
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cost of µqs(j)zs(j)dt over the time interval dt, each research firm participating
in the innovation race in sector s can attain the stock value Js(j) of a successful
entrepreneur with the leading technology in industry j with probability hs(j).
Thus, free entry into any innovation race leads to the zero-profit conditions
φ(zs(j))Js(j) = µqs(j) (14)
which hold for all industries in either sector.
Each firm participating in a R&D race has no internal funds to finance its R&D
activities and must therefore issue equity claims. These claims pay nothing if the
firms’ R&D efforts fail, but yield the profit stream (10), being paid out contin-
uously as dividends, if the firm succeeds in winning the race and last as long as
the firm keeps the industry leadership. With probability hs(j), one of the tar-
geted innovation efforts will succeed and a new entrepreneur will take over the
leadership so that equity owners of the incumbent firm will suffer a total capital
loss of Js(j). Before being able to implement the new technology, the innovating
firm must first open up new vacancies to find suitable workers to operate the new
technology embodied in the new component.
Due to matching frictions in the labour market, there is an expected delay of
ds = 1/f(θs) to fill vacancies, where fs is the rate at which vacancies are occupied
and θs is an indicator of market tightness. To keep the analysis tractable, we
follow Aghion, Howitt (1994) in assuming that by the law of large numbers,
the time it takes to fill each vacancy is deterministic. Therefore, during the time
span ds, the current components will still be in use. This means that the total
time a component of a particular vintage is in operation is independent of the
time needed to fill a vacancy, as the search process delays the starting and the
end point by the same amount. Once the vacancies have been filled, the demand
for all previous vintages drops to zero and the workers using these now obsolete
components are dismissed. Letting τ denote the random time interval between two
innovations in an industry in a specific sector, then due to the Poisson process,
τ is exponentially distributed over an infinite time horizon with parameter hs(j).
Therefore, the value Js(j) of a research firm owning the leading technology qs(j)



















where it will be shown below that in the steady-state equilibrium the interest
rate r is constant.
6 Matching Technology in the Labour Markets
Vacancies posted by firms are skill-specific. It is assumed that the cost c of posting
a vacancy (measured in terms of final output) is irrespective of skill type. A low-
skilled worker cannot apply for a high-skilled job because he is assumed to be
unable to operate the components used in the high-skilled sector. The high-skilled,
on the other hand, can perform the tasks of the low-skilled workers. However, the
returns to search are always higher when applying to high-skilled vacancies as
will be shown below. This means that a high-skilled worker has no incentive to
apply for a low-skilled job.
The matching function is assumed to be the same for both skill-types and takes
on the standard form
ms = m(us, vs) (16)
where ms denotes the number of matches and vs the vacancy rate for type s
workers. The matching function is assumed to be concave, increasing in both
arguments and homogeneous of degree one.4




, f ′ (θs) < 0 (17)
where θs ≡ vsus is an indicator of labour-market tightness with increasing values
of θs implying that firms will need longer to find suitable workers.
4 See Petrongolo, Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature
on matching functions. In this survey many articles are cited confirming that a matching
function which is homogeneous of degree one is consistent with the overwhelming empirical
evidence.
10
Using this equation, the rate at which the unemployed find a job in sector s is
ms
us
= f (θs) θs (18)
By the properties of the matching function (16), f (θs) has an elasticity in the
interval (−1, 0). Therefore, the job-finding-rate is an increasing function in θs,
implying that the higher the ratio of vacancies to job-seekers is, the easier (and
faster) will workers find a new job.
The value of a vacancy to a firm in sector s is denoted by W Vs as long as it
is vacant and by W Fs once a successful applicant has been found so that the
corresponding Bellman equation can be derived as
rW Vs = f (θs) (W
F
s −W Vs )− c (19)
Thus, the return on a vacancy is equal to the expected gain from finding a suit-
able applicant minus the costs of keeping the vacancy open. Since there is free
market entry, job creation will occur as long as there are positive rents so that






i.e. that the value of filling a position is equal to the expected search costs.
Therefore, a tighter labour market leading to a longer search time, implies that
the value of any newly opened vacancies must rise accordingly.
The value of a job from the perspective of an employed worker is denoted by V Es






s − V Us (21)
Assuming that this surplus is divided amongst firms and workers according to
a bargaining process where βs denotes worker (or union) bargaining power leads
to:
W Fs = (1− βs)Ss (22)
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so that
V Es − V Us = βsSs (23)
Since firms have the option of closing the job at any point in time and workers
can always quit a job, a filled position continues in operation as long as the value
of the surplus is positive. With ws denoting the respective wage rates, the three




s can be written as
rW Fs = ys − ws + hs(W Vs −W Fs ) (24)
rV Es = ws + hs(V
U
s − V Es ) (25)
rV Us = f (θs) θs(V
E
s − V Us ) (26)
where from above, hs is the arrival rate of new innovations and ys ≡ ps∂Ys/∂Ns
is the value of marginal output of a worker in sector s.
Using equations (22) to (26) we can express the wage rates ws as
ws = βsys + (1− βs)rV Us (27)
where
rV Us =
r + hs + βsf (θs) θsys
r + hs + βsf (θs) θs
(28)
Finally, using (19) and (24) one obtains
c =
f (θs) (1− βs)(ys − rV Us )
r + hs
(29)
Using equations (20) to (28), enables us to solve for the value of a total match
yields




As noted above, as soon as a zero-surplus Ss is reached, a job will be destroyed.






where the r.h.s. is the expected return to searching for a job.
Assuming that low-skilled workers are more likely to be organised in a union
and thus have a higher bargaining power βl than do high-skilled workers, means
that for a given productivity level, the high-skilled labour market will be tighter.
The returns to searching for a job are the opportunity costs of being employed
and correspond to the minimum wage that is needed to prevent a worker from
quitting. As long as these opportunity costs of employment is not too large, it
will outweigh the costs of terminating the job and opening up a new vacancy.
As can be seen from equation (30), an increase in ys means that jobs with a lower
job-specific productivity are still profitable so that more vacancies will be created
as a result, i.e. labour-market tightness θs increases. Secondly, a higher bargaining
position βs will lead to a higher ratio of unemployed workers to vacancies (i.e. a
reduction in θs) as each job becomes less profitable for firms. Finally, solving (28)
and (29) for c shows that factors leading to an increase in the innovation rates
hs result in a lower labour-market tightness θs. This can be explained by the fact
that higher innovation rates increase the rates at which jobs are destroyed leading
to a larger number of unemployed relative to the number of vacancies.
In order to endogenously determine us and vs a flow-equilibrium condition is
needed which is characterised by
m(us, vs)dt = (1− us)hsdt (31)




hs + θsf (θs)
(32)
This enables us to determine the steady-state equilibrium of the model and allows
us to derive some comparative statics in the next section.
7 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In a steady-state equilibrium, the value of firms owning the leading technologies















for all j ∈ [0, 1] and s = {l, h}. The l.h.s of (33) denotes the flow profits for
innovating firms from component sales to the intermediate goods producers. If
these profits increase, the research effort zs(j) aimed at component j will also
rise. The profits will be higher if the product price is higher or more workers
use the new component so that their demand is higher. Given symmetric firms,
it can be seen from (33) that zs(j) = zs within both sectors, so that the same
amount of research effort is aimed at all components in either sector. Seeing as
the r.h.s of (33) is increasing in research effort zs, it follows that the relative
research effort zh/zl is increasing in ph/pl(e
−rdhNh/e
−rdlNl)
α. This means that if
ph is high relative to pl, it is more profitable to invent high-skill-complementary





















Equation (34) shows the expected price-effect: Since σ > 1 is assumed, an in-
crease in relative high-skilled labour employment Nh/Nl will lower the relative
price of the high-skilled product so that researching for low-skill complementary
technologies becomes more attractive. However, this argument does not take the
effect on average technology due to an increase in relative high-skilled labour
demand into account.
In a steady state, Qh/Ql must be constant so that the respective growth rates of
the technologies must be equal which only occurs if research effort is the same

























As can be seen from equation (36), relative average (endogenous) technology is an
increasing function of relative labour supply, i.e. if there are more workers using
components designed for the high-skilled, it will become increasingly profitable
to develop components that can be used by this worker group.
Assuming perfect competition for the consumption good Y leads to
1 = δσp1−σl + (1− δ)
σp1−σh (37)















where zh = zl = z
∗ is the equilibrium research effort targeted at any component
in either sector. In the case of perfect labour markets with no frictions and no
unemployment, the term in square brackets would be larger. Thus, it can immedi-
ately be seen from (38) that the profits from technology sales are lower than they
are in the case of perfectly competitive labour markets. These lower profits re-
duce the incentives to research. As shown below, the interest rate is an increasing
function of the growth rate. Therefore, in order for (38) to hold with equality, the
interest and growth rates must also be lower than in the case where all markets
are fully competitive. There are three reasons for this lower growth rate. Firstly,
with unemployment there are fewer employees in each sector which lowers in-
novation incentives. Secondly, the lower number of workers reduces the amount
of final output and thus the available research resources. These are pure scale
effects. Thirdly, with matching frictions, all successful innovators have to delay
the introduction of their technology by the time interval ds, further reducing the
net value of the innovation.
With this equilibrium research intensity z∗, the economy’s growth rate g∗ is de-
termined in terms of the exogenous innovation size λ and the steady state arrival
rate h∗ = z∗φ(z∗), i.e.5
g∗ = g∗(λ, h∗), g∗
′
(λ) > 0, g∗
′
(h∗) > 0 (39)
5 Acemoglu (1998) argues that the growth rate g∗ can be expressed by g∗ = (λ−1)h∗. However,
this is not the correct expression which, normalising initial qualities of all components to one,
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This implies that in equilibrium equation (2) becomes
r = ρ+ γg∗ (40)
Finally, equations (30), (32) and (38) yield three equations (for each sector) in
the three remaining unknowns, us, vs and z
∗.
As it is assumed that the high-skilled have a higher marginal productivity and a
lower bargaining power βh means that the value of their output yh will be higher.
Therefore, as can be seen from equation (30), the labour market for the high-
skilled is tighter. Inserting this result together with the fact that the research
intensity is identical in both sectors into the unemployment equation (32) shows
that the unemployment rate is lower for the high-skilled than for the low-skilled.
Further, the higher labour-market tightness for the high-skilled also means that
they need a shorter time period to find a new job.
Turning to the wage differential between the two skill groups, it can be seen from
equation (27) that wages for the two skill groups in terms of the final goods are





















































where bj are the number of quality improvements of component j.
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The relationship given by (42) shows that a higher value of ψ which c.p. leads
to a rise in the supply of high-skilled labour Nh, can lead to an increase in the
wage differential between high- and low-skill labour. There are two effects of a
higher supply of high-skilled labour which counteract each other. Firstly, there is
the standard substitution effect which decreases the wage differential. Secondly,
there is the directed technology effect, whereby a larger number of high-skilled
workers increases the demand for components complementary to these workers
and so alters the direction of technological change leading to an increase in the
wage differential. The second effect is more likely to dominate the larger σ is,
i.e. the closer substitutes the two intermediates are, or the higher α is, i.e. the
smaller are the decreasing returns to labour within each sector. Further, it can be
seen from the threshold productivity level equation (30), that for the case that the
directed technology effect outweighs the substitution effect, firms employing high-
skilled labour will create more vacancies so that the high-skilled labour market
becomes tighter, i.e. θh increases. This means that firms in this sector will require
longer to fill their vacancies, which reduces the incentives to innovate for this
sector. However, whether the R&D intensity rises or falls depends on whether
the total returns to innovative activities, as given by the l.h.s of equation (38),
decrease or increase. This cannot be unambiguously determined, as the increase
in the high-skilled labour supply is counteracted by the decrease in the supply
of the low-skilled. However, for the case that the increased high-skilled labour-
market tightness and the decrease in the supply of the low-skilled dominate, the
research intensity z∗ and therefore the innovation arrival rate h∗ will decline. In
this case, it can be seen from the Beveridge curve (32), that the high-skilled
unemployment rate decreases. Seeing as the value of marginal output by the
low-skilled will decrease for large values of α or σ, their labour-market tightness
will decline. In this case, even if the job-destruction rate is lower due to the
lower research intensity, fewer jobs will also be created so that the low-skilled
unemployment rate may rise or fall depending on which effect is stronger.
Finally, (42) also shows that the wage differential depends on the relative bar-
gaining power of the two types of labour. Assuming that low-skilled workers are
more likely to be unionised than their high-skilled counterparts and therefore
have a higher bargaining power βl and that this bargaining power is particu-
larly strong in most European countries, will lead to wage differentials in these
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countries being more compressed than in countries with weaker union power. This
result corresponds to empirical comparisons of relatively high wage differentials in
Anglo-Saxon countries with little union power, and much lower wage differentials
in most European countries.
A decrease in the distribution parameter δ, i.e. a shift away from the low-skilled
towards high-skilled workers leads directly, as can be seen from (41), to a higher
relative value of the high-skilled marginal output yh and therefore, by equation
(42), to an increase in the wage differential. As above, this leads to a rise in
the market tightness for the high-skilled and also to a decrease in the returns
to innovation. Further, as δ > 0.5, this reduction in the distribution parameter
lowers the profits from research. Both effects lead to a reduction in the innovation
arrival rate h∗ and thereby to a reduced job-destruction rate, so that the high-
skilled unemployment rate falls. At the same time, the low-skilled labour market
will become less tight as δ decreases, so that it is not unambiguously clear whether
the unemployment rate will be higher or lower than before.
A rise in either the rate of time preference ρ or the elasticity of marginal utility
γ both lead to a higher interest rate r. On the one hand, this higher interest rate
leads to an increase in the r.h.s of the innovation intensity equation (38) and on
the other hand, the returns to innovating, i.e. the l.h.s of (38), decreases. In the
new equilibrium, this decrease in the returns can only be compensated by firms
closing vacancies so that the labour markets become less tight. This however
means that unemployed individuals need longer to find a new job so that the
unemployment rates rise. Further, the lower returns to innovation will also lead
to a lower research intensity which works to both counteract the initial increases
in the interest rate as well as the rise in the unemployment rates. As all of these
adjustments affect both sectors equally, the direction of technological change will
not be altered, so that the wage differential will also remain unchanged.
The same qualitative results occur if the size of technological improvements λ
increases which leads to a higher growth rate. In this case, as can be seen from
equation (40), the interest rate r will rise and the same adjustment mechanism
as described above will occur.
The parameter µ is a measure of the marginal research costs associated with in-
venting a new higher quality component. Therefore, an increase in this parameter
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will mean that temporarily, the costs of inventing a new component, as given by
the r.h.s of equation (38), will be higher than the returns. This means that the
research intensity z∗ and thereby the innovation arrival rate h∗ must fall. This
means that the job-destruction rate also falls, so that by equation (32), the re-
spective unemployment rates will also decline. This in turn increases the demand
for components, thereby increasing the returns from innovation. As these costs
equally influence the costs of new components in both sectors, no skill-bias will
result, so that the relative productivities of the two labour types and thus the
wage differential will remain constant.
There are two direct effects of higher values of either the substitution elasticity
σ or the elasticity of output with respect to labour α. Firstly, as can be seen
from equation (41), the relative value of high-skilled marginal output will rise so
that the wage-differential between the two groups also increases. Secondly, the
returns to innovating will increase as innovations now yield a higher flow profit.
These direct changes lead to the labour market for the high-skilled becoming
relatively tighter. Although this means that firms will now need longer to fill their
vacancies so that the return to a new innovation will decrease as it will not be
implemented for a longer time period, the overall effect is that research intensity
rises. This leads to a higher job-destruction rate so that the overall effect on high-
skilled unemployment is ambiguous. On the one hand the higher labour market
tightness will decrease high-skilled unemployment, on the other hand the higher
innovation arrival rate will increase it. However, the low-skilled unemployment
rate will unambiguously rise as due to their lower value of marginal output there
will be fewer vacancies as well as a higher job-destruction rate.
The final comparative static effect to be analysed is an increase in the costs of
posting a vacancy c. As can be seen from equation (30) which defines the threshold
productivity level, higher vacancy costs imply that the critical productivity level
must also adapt and rise accordingly. At the same time, with higher vacancy costs,
some vacancies will now no longer yield a positive surplus so that labour-market
tightness must fall. This lower value of θs means that firms will need a shorter
time period to hire new workers once a new component has been innovated. This
increases the returns to innovation so that research intensity z∗ increases. With
both fewer vacancies and a higher innovation arrival rate h∗, the unemployment
rates for both labour types must increase. Seeing as these higher costs effect both
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sectors equally, the direction of technological change remains unchanged so that
the wage differential will also remain unchanged.
8 Conclusion
Since the 1980s, the supply of high-skilled labour has increased in all developed
economies. At the same time, technological change has been (high-)skilled-biased,
the wage differential between high- and low-skilled workers has increased and un-
employment rates have remained roughly constant for the high-skilled whereas
they have increased sharply for the low-skilled. The model presented here is able
to simultaneously explain these empirical facts as the direction of technological
change is endogenously determined. This means that an increase in high-skilled
labour will lead to two counteracting effects. On the one hand, a higher supply
will lead to a lower wage for this skill-group causing firms to create more positions
for these workers. At the same time, researchers will increase their research efforts
aimed at components used by high-skilled workers so that technological change
will be high-skill biased. Although this bias increases the rate of job destruction,
under plausible conditions the job-creation effect will dominate so that the un-
employment rate of these workers will fall. At the same time, the increased rate
of technological change aimed at high-skilled workers will increase their produc-
tivity so that the wage differential also rises. Finally, we find that the innovation
rate of an economy characterised by imperfect labour markets is lower than in
a perfectly competitive economy. There are three reasons for this result. Firstly,
with unemployment there are fewer employees in each sector which lowers in-
novation incentives. Secondly, the lower number of workers reduces the amount
of final output and thus the available research resources. These are pure scale
effects. Thirdly, with matching frictions, all successful innovators have to delay
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